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By William Schabas 
 
Descriptive Title: 
The Genocide Convention does not Assist the Prosecutor with respect to non-
party States to the Rome Statute. No Legal Rule Resolves the Conflict between 
Decisions of the African Union and Obligations Resulting from the Rome 
Statute. 
 
Summary of Opinion: 
On the Genocide Convention. Many African States, including some directly 
involved in issues concerning enforcement of the Al Bashir arrest warrants, are not 
Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention. For those that are, a distinction must 
be made between States Parties and non-party States to the Rome Statute. The legal 
regime applicable to States Parties is slightly enhanced by the possibility of recourse 
to the International Court of Justice in accordance with article IX of the Genocide 
Convention. This conclusion results from the Bosnia v. Serbia ruling of the 
International Court of Justice. For non-party States, there does not seem to be any 
particular impact of the Genocide Convention, as they have not accepted the 
International Criminal Court, something required by article VI of the Genocide 
Convention. In any event, no obligation to prosecute under the Genocide Convention 
arises if genocide has not in fact been established. The insistence of the Prosecutor 
and the holding by Pre-Trial Chamber I that there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ 
genocide has been committed must be weighed against much authority to the 
contrary. 
On the African Union. States Parties to the Rome Statute are under an obligation to 
cooperate with the International Criminal Court in the enforcement of the Al Bashir 
arrest warrants. However, two Decisions of the African Union, which are binding 
upon Member States, require that the arrest warrants not be enforced. Thus, African 
States that are members of the African Union and that are also States Parties to the 
Rome Statute are confronted with conflicting obligations. These cannot be resolved 
by principles of interpretation. The impasse requires a political solution. 
 
 
Argument: 
 
1. Obligations of Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention to implement 
arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court. 
 
A discussion of the obligations of States Parties to the Genocide Convention to 
implement arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court can usefully 
begin by recalling the low rate of ratification of the Convention by African States. Of 
the fifty-four members of the African Union, only thirty-one are parties to the 
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Genocide Convention. For example, some of the countries that have failed to respect 
their obligation to enforce arrest warrants of the International Criminal Court, such as 
Chad, Kenya and the Central African Republic, have not ratified or acceded to the 
Genocide Convention. 
 The low ratification rate in Africa is a puzzling phenomenon. Of the fifty-one 
United Nations Member States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention, 
approximately half are in Africa. This is all the more striking given that the most 
important violations of the Genocide Convention in recent decades have taken place 
in Africa. The failure of so many African states to ratify the Convention probably 
does not indicate any particular disagreement with the substance of the instrument. 
Rather, it may simply result from the fact that the Convention was adopted prior to 
decolonization, and newly independent African States willingly ratified human rights 
treaties that were adopted subsequently, such as the International Covenants, but did 
not necessarily review all of the already existing instruments and ratify them. Article 
XII of the Convention allows States parties to extend the application of the 
Convention to sovereign territories for which they are responsible. The only relevant 
application of this provision to Africa is the 1952 declaration by Belgium declaring 
the Convention applicable to the Belgian Congo and to the Trust Territory of 
Rwanda-Urundi. Arguably, the Convention remained in force for these countries 
following decolonisation. In any event, the Democratic Republic of the Congo made a 
declaration of succession on 31 May 1962; Rwanda and Burundi acceded to the 
Convention on 15 April 1975 and 6 January 1997 respectively. 
 Two provisions of the Convention are especially relevant in addressing the 
obligations imposed upon Contracting States to the Genocide Convention as regards 
arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court. 
 
Article 1 
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, 
is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish. 
 
Article 6 
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3 shall be tried by a 
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international 
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have 
accepted its jurisdiction. 
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 The International Court of Justice addressed the issue of the obligations of 
States Parties to the Genocide Convention to cooperate with international criminal 
tribunals in the Bosnia v. Serbia case. There, the Court held that Serbia had violated 
its obligations under the Genocide Convention by having failed to transfer Ratko 
Mladić to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, where he 
was charged with genocide, thereby failing fully to co-operate with the Tribunal. The 
Court treated the issue under the heading ‘the obligation to punish genocide’. The 
Court recalled that article VI obliges the Contracting Parties to cooperate with an 
‘international penal tribunal’ to the extent that they ‘shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction’ According to the Court, this ‘implies that they will arrest persons accused 
of genocide who are in their territory - even if the crime of which they are accused 
was committed outside it - and, failing prosecution of them in the parties’ own courts, 
that they will hand them over for trial by the competent international tribunal’.1 The 
Court observed that the drafters of the Convention had contemplated an international 
criminal tribunal established by treaty rather than by resolution of the Security 
Council, but said it would be contrary to the object of the Convention to exclude a 
tribunal created in such a manner.
2
 This issue does not even arise with respect to the 
International Criminal Court because it is indeed established by treaty. 
The Court then turned to the question of whether Serbia had ‘accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court’, concluding this to be the case. Serbia had not, of course, 
actually ratified the Statue of the International Criminal Tribunal. This is not legally 
possible given that the founding instrument of the Tribunal is a Security Council 
resolution. Nevertheless, Serbia had assumed an obligation to cooperate when it 
accepted the Dayton Agreement, which explicitly requires cooperation with the 
International Tribunal.
3
 The Court said that ‘the admission of the [Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia] to the United Nations in 2000 provided a further basis for its obligation 
to co-operate’.4 
It is tempting to draw upon this as support for an obligation imposed upon 
Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention who are not States parties to the 
                                                 
1
  Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro]), 26 February 2007, para. 
443. 
2
  Ibid., para. 445 
3
  Ibid., para. 447. 
4
  Ibid., para. 447. 
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Rome Statute to cooperate with the International Criminal Court in enforcing the 
arrest warrants, given that the jurisdiction of the Court over The Sudan was 
established by Security Council resolution rather than by consent. The Sudan is not a 
State Party to the Rome Statute. Therefore, the situation is not identical to what was 
considered by the International Court of Justice in the Bosnia case. In particular, there 
is no comparable act of commitment to the institution analogous to the acceptance of 
the Dayton Agreement by Serbia. Nevertheless, there is the suggestion that the 
obligation flows from the Charter of the United Nations. While this is not further 
explained, it may well be that the Court considered that Serbia had ‘accepted’ the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia by virtue of its membership 
in the United Nations. 
In the Darfur case, the extent of Security Council involvement is the referral of 
the situation in accordance with article 13(b). Basically, there are two approaches to 
assessing the scope of the referral. There is a large view, by which the referral has 
some special additional implications, such as the removal of Head of State immunity 
that would normally exist under customary international law. The more narrow 
approach derives support from the drafting history of the Rome Statute, which 
indicates an intent to restrict the authority of the Security Council, and certainly does 
not point to additional implications of such referral. Furthermore, operative paragraph 
2 of the Security Council resolution referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the 
International Criminal Court ‘recogniz[es] that States not party to the Rome Statute 
have no obligation under the Statute’.5 These words seem inconsistent with the idea 
that there is an implied duty to cooperate with the Court flowing either from the 
Genocide Convention, which has, after all, been ratified by the permanent members of 
the Security Council, or from customary international law. 
When all of these elements are taken into account, the argument that 
Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention that have not ratified the Rome 
Statute are nevertheless under some obligation to cooperate with the International 
Criminal Court seems difficult to sustain. The only States that are not parties to the 
Rome Statute but that are Contracting States to the Genocide Convention and that are 
required to cooperate with the Court are ‘the Government of Sudan and all other 
                                                 
5
  UN Doc S/RES/1593 (2005), para. 2. 
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parties to the conflict in Darfur’, but this obligation arises from operative paragraph 2 
of Security Council Resolution 1593(2005) rather than from the Genocide Convention 
itself. 
With regard to Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention that are also 
States Parties to the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court is indeed the 
tribunal contemplated by article VI of the Convention. As a result, such States are 
obliged to cooperate with the Court by virtue not only of the Rome Statute itself but 
also article I of the Genocide Convention, in accordance with the pronouncement of 
the International Court of Justice. The major consequence of this is to confer 
jurisdiction upon the International Court of Justice, pursuant to article XI of the 
Convention, enabling it to consider applications alleging that a Contracting State has 
indeed breached article I by failing to cooperate with the International Criminal Court. 
The only exception here would be if the State had formulated a reservation to article 
IX. Since the withdrawal of Rwanda’s reservation to article IX, there do not appear to 
be any operative reservations by African states, so this is not in practice an issue of 
any substance. 
Even if such obligations do in fact exist under the Genocide Convention, it 
cannot be said that a State has violated the provisions of the treaty because it fails to 
enforce an arrest warrant that charges genocide. There can only be a violation of the 
Genocide Convention if genocide is actually established. The fact that the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court has insisted upon charging the President of Sudan 
with genocide, and the fact that three judges of a Pre-Trial Chamber have agreed that 
there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that genocide was committed,6 does not 
mean that the charge is proven in a satisfactory manner. It is worth recalling that the 
Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to a request from the Security Council 
did not conclude, in its January 2005 report, that genocide had been committed.
7
 Nor 
did the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, in his first applications for 
arrest warrants in the Situation in Darfur, Sudan, allege that genocide had been 
                                                 
6
  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application 
for a Warrant of Arrest, 12 July 2010. 
7
  Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, 
Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004, UN Doc. 
S/2005/60, annex.  
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committed in Darfur.
8
 The approach of the Prosecutor himself is therefore 
characterized by ambivalence. Even the Pre-Trial Chamber, in its initial decision on 
the application for an arrest warrant against President El Bashir, of 4 March 2009, 
communicated its own serious doubts about the validity of a genocide charge.
9
 The 
charge that genocide was committed in Darfur and that Sudan’s President is 
personally responsible remains tenuous. It cannot be said that a State has violated its 
obligations to punish the crime of genocide if in fact genocide has not been 
committed. Only if and when this is established can there be a breach of the 
Convention. 
 
2. Obligations of African Union Member States to Implement ICC arrest 
warrants generally 
 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union of the African 
Union has decided that ‘AU Member States shall not cooperate with the ICC in the 
arrest and surrender of President El-Bashir of The Sudan’.10 This Decision, adopted in 
Kampala in July 2010, affirms a Decision adopted the previous year but couched in 
slightly different terms: ‘Decides that in view of the fact that the request by the 
African Union has never been acted upon, the AU Member States shall not cooperate 
pursuant to the provisions of article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to 
immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan.’11 
The Assembly is empowered to determine the common policies of the Union, 
and to receive, consider and take decisions on reports and recommendations from the 
other organs of the Union.
12
 Although there is no explicit statement to this effect, 
decisions of the Assembly appear to be intended to have a binding effect, because 
article 23 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union provides that sanctions may be 
                                                 
8
  Prosecutor v. Harun (ICC-02/05-01/07), Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun, 17 April 2007; 
Prosecutor v. Kushayb (ICC-02/05-01/07), Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb, 27 April 2007, 
9
  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest, 4 March 2009. 
10
  Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Decision 
Assembly/AU/DEC.270(XIV) on the Second Ministerial meeting on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, para. 5. 
11
  Decesion on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC),, Doc Assembly/AU/13(XIII), para. 10. 
12
  Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 9(a) and (b). 
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imposed upon ‘any Member State that fails to comply with the decisions and policies 
of the Union’. When Pre-Trial Chamber I informed the Security Council that ‘the 
Republic of Kenya has a clear obligation to cooperate with the Court in relation to the 
enforcement of such warrants of arrest’,13 and did likewise using slightly different 
terms with respect to Chad,
14
 the Commission of the African Union issued a press 
release stating that ‘[t]he decisions adopted by the AU policy organs are binding on 
Chad and Kenya…’15 
 Therefore, with respect to Member States of the African Union that are also 
States Parties to the Rome Statute, there would appear to be a conflict between the 
binding obligations imposed by the Rome Statute and the binding obligations imposed 
by the Decisions of the African Union. Conflicts in international norms can be 
resolved in a number of ways. For example, one norm may be hierarchically superior 
to the other, in which case the former will prevail. This is the case, for example, with 
norms that are in conflict with the Charter of the United Nations. However, the arrest 
warrant debate does not involve the Charter of the United Nations. It is also the case if 
one of the norms can be described as jus cogens. Although the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court deals with crimes that have often been characterized in 
this manner, it is highly doubtful that the essentially procedural obligation to enforce 
an arrest warrant can be so described. 
 Otherwise, apparent conflicts in norms may be resolved by techniques of 
interpretation that, in effect, deliver an analysis by which there is in fact no actual 
conflict. This is the approach taken by Amnesty International in a recent report.
16
 
Amnesty International’s reasoning seems quite contrived, however, and is very 
difficult to reconcile with the very clear wording of the African Union Decisions. 
According to Amnesty International, it was the intent of the African Union that its 
                                                 
13
  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision informing the United Nations Security 
Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's 
presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya , 27 August 2010. 
14
  Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision informing the United Nations Security 
Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's 
presence in the territory of Chad, 27 August 2010. 
15
  African Union Commission, Press release No. 119/2010 on the Decision of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the ICC informing the UN Security Council and the Assembly of the States 
Parties to the Rome Statute about the presence of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of the 
Sudan in the territories of the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Kenya, 29 August 2010. 
16
  Amnesty International, Bringing Power to Justice, Absence of Immunity for Heads of State 
Before the International Criminal Court, December 2010, pp. 31-37. 
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Decisions be consistent with the Rome Statute. Apparently, this is explained by its 
reference to article 98 of the Statute in the first of the two Decisions. But, says 
Amnesty International, the African Union’s ‘provisional interpretation’ of article 98 is 
not correct. It seems far-fetched to conclude that the African Union intended that its 
Decision ordering States not to enforce the arrest warrants be consistent with the 
Rome Statute, and at the same time to declare the interpretation of a provision of the 
Rome Statute upon which the Decision of the African Union is based to be erroneous. 
 The heart of Amnesty International’s critique of the African Union decisions, 
and indeed its entire analysis of the issue, is predicated on its rejection
17
 of the 
decision of the 2002 International Court of Justice in this area.
18
 However, in 
preparing an academic legal opinion addressing the obligations of African Union 
Member States, a distinction must be made between what Amnesty International (and 
others) would like the law to become, and what it actually is. 
 There has been much debate in the academic literature about the role of 
immunities in the case of President Al Bashir.
19
 Article 98(1) declares: 
 
Article 98. Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender  
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the 
State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain 
the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
 
Under customary law, it seems unchallengeable that the Head of State of Sudan 
benefits from immunity with regard to national justice systems except those of his 
own State. Not only does article 98(1) acknowledge the right of a State to invoke such 
immunities, it is even worded in such a way as to imply that this is mandatory. The 
report of Amnesty International suggests that there are no such immunities under 
international law. But if this were the case, then article 98(1) would be futile. In the 
Congo v. Belgium case, the International Court of Justice recognized that immunities 
of Heads of State and senior officials, such as ministers of foreign affairs, remain 
                                                 
17
  Ibid., p. 25 : ‘Amnesty International disagrees with these narrow findings.’ 
18
  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 
[2002] ICJ Reports 3, para. 58. 
19
  See, e.g., Dapo Akande, ’The Jurisdication of the International Criminal Court over Nationals 
of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’, (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justicre 
618; Paola Gaeta, ’Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?" (2009) 7 Journal 
of International Criminal Justicre 315. 
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effective under international law even with respect to prosecutions for genocide and 
crimes against humanity. 
 Article 27 of the Rome Statute is also relevant: 
 
Article 27. Irrelevance of official capacity  
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity.  In 
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction 
of sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether 
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person. 
 
Principles of interpretation require that articles 27 and 98 be read together in such a 
way as to make them both effective. Article 27(2) suggests there are no immunities 
before the Court, yet article 98(1) requires the Court to observe them. The solution is 
really quite simple: in ratifying the Rome Statute, States Parties agree that the 
immunities to which they are entitled in accordance with customary international do 
not apply before the International Criminal Court. This is the effect of article 27(2). 
Non-party States have not abandoned such immunity because they have not accepted 
the Rome Statute. If the Prosecutor contemplates prosecuting the Head of State of a 
non-party State, article 98(2) instructs the Court not to proceed because this would 
require the requested State to act in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under 
international law. This is an interpretation that disappoints those who would prefer 
that there be no immunity, of course. But immunity is a fact of international law, and 
the Rome Statute confirms this. 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, in Bashir, held that the position of the accused person as 
head of State of a non-party State ‘has no effect on the Court's jurisdiction over the 
present case’.20 It said this conclusion was based upon four considerations. The first is 
a rather gratuitous and unhelpful reference in the preamble to the core goals of the 
Statute, which are ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, which “must not go 
unpunished”’.21 The second consists of an equally gratuitous and unhelpful recital of 
                                                 
20
  Prosecutor v. Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para. 41. 
21
  Ibid., para. 42. 
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the terms of article 27.
22
 The third is more compelling: a reference to article 21 of the 
Statute, and the observation that unless there is a lacuna in the Statute the Court is not 
to apply other sources of law.
23
 The message is that even if general public 
international law provides for Head of State immunity, it is not formally contemplated 
by article 27 and therefore cannot be invoked in proceedings before the Court. But the 
Pre-Trial Chamber did not reference article 98(1). Finally, the Pre-Trial Chamber said 
that by referring the Darfur situation to the Court in accordance with article 13(b) of 
the Statute, the Security Council ‘accepted that the investigation into the said 
situation, as well as any prosecution arising therefrom, will take place in accordance 
with the statutory framework provided for in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and 
the Rules as a whole’.24 The reasoning of the Pre-Trial Chamber rests upon an 
interpretation of article 27(2) by which it applies to Heads of State of non-party States 
because the provision does not say the contrary. But a construction by which article 
27(2) only applies to States Parties is certainly equally plausible, if not more so. To 
start with, the Chamber might have considered article 34 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties: ‘A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
State without its consent.’25 Moreover, as we have already mentioned, if article 27(2) 
applies to Heads of State of non-party States, then what is the purpose of article 
98(1)? Surely it is also reasonable to presume that the Security Council took all of 
these elements into account and did not consider that the referral of the Situation in 
Darfur, Sudan to the Court encroached upon existing immunities of Heads of State of 
non-party States. The consequence of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s reasoning is that the 
Security Council also intended to strip the presidents of the United States, Russia and 
China of their immunity before the International Criminal Court. I really doubt that 
this is what it intended, and suspect that a quick verification with senior legal officers 
of the concerned governments would confirm this. 
Pre-Trial Chamber I might also have considered the Relationship Agreement 
between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, which is instructive 
for the interpretation of article 27(2) of the Rome Statute. During the negotiations of 
the Relationship Agreement, in 2001, the Government of Belgium, which for many 
                                                 
22
  Ibid., para. 43. 
23
  Ibid., para. 44. 
24
  Ibid., para. 45. 
25
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art. 34. 
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years adopted a rather extreme position on immunities, reflected in the dissenting 
opinion of ad hoc judge Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant case,
26
 proposed the 
following provision: ‘Paragraph 1 of this article shall be without prejudice to the 
relevant norms of international law, particularly article 6 of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and article 27 of the Statute, in 
respect of the crimes that come under the jurisdiction of the Court.’ In other words, 
Belgium’s position was that United Nations officials did not benefit from immunity 
with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. When the text of 
the Relationship Agreement was being prepared, Belgium was embroiled in its 
litigation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo before the International Court of 
Justice, and obviously understood that recognition of immunity for United Nations 
officials in that text would seem incompatible with its claim that there was no 
immunity at all for the core crimes of international law. But Belgium’s provision was 
rejected by negotiators for the United Nations, whose objections were sustained by 
the representatives of the Court. The final version of the Agreement confirms the 
immunities to which officials of the United Nations are entitled. According to article 
19 of the Relationship Agreement, the United Nations agrees to waive these 
immunities. But if article 27(2) removed such immunity, there would be no need for 
any such provision, and this was precisely the point that Belgium had unsuccessfully 
tried to confirm. 
For these reasons, and contrary to the arguments submitted by Amnesty 
International, the obligations imposed by the African Union Decisions concerning 
non-enforcement of arrest warrants of the International Criminal Court and those 
imposed by the Rome Statute upon States Parties to the Rome Statute cannot be 
reconciled. Nor is there any apparent rule or formula establishing a hierarchy by 
which one prevails over the other. This conflict of legal norms requires a political 
solution. 
When African States questioned the wisdom of issuance of the arrest warrant 
against an African head of State involved in a delicate peace process, they were met 
with rather abrupt references to article 16 of the Rome Statute. But article 16, which 
authorises the Security Council to suspend prosecutions, was inserted in the Statute as 
                                                 
26
  ‘Proposal submitted by Belgium concerning document PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/L.1’, 
PCNICC/2000/WGICC-UN/DP.18. 
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a compromise in order to win support from some permanent members of the Council 
as the negotiations progressed. Most States participating in the Rome Conference 
would have preferred to see article 16 removed entirely. The suggestion that article 16 
provides a unique mechanism to block prosecution where there may be dramatic and 
unpredictable consequences for ongoing conflicts should not be sustained. 
Remonstrating with African States that are parties to the Rome Statute about their 
obligations to enforce arrest warrants is unlikely to provide a productive result and a 
way out of the impasse. It only contributes to the festering malaise in Africa’s 
relationship with the International Criminal Court. Rather, due account must be taken 
of the concerns reflected in the African Union decisions. 
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